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A B S T R A C T   
The Sierra Leone energy sector suffers from multiple problems of inadequate capacity and finance. Most of the 
population does not have access to electricity, and supply is often unreliable. At the same time the country has 
been trying to implement significant structural and economic reforms, aimed both at government policy ob-
jectives and more market-driven operation. The focus of this paper is to achieve a better understanding of current 
decision-making processes and issues in terms of their impact on inception, planning, implementation and 
operation of projects. This should assist consideration of organisation and governance for the sector. The method 
has been to apply the Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed (RACI) matrix with surveys of key 
actors in the sector including ministries, utilities and regulatory bodies, development partners and independent 
power producers. These were predominantly middle or senior managers most closely associated with the elec-
trification. An initial online survey with 11 key informants allowed us to identify important linkages in decision- 
making processes. A further 16 face-to-face interviews with 30 interviewees added depth and helped identify 
weaknesses and challenges. Key findings relate to the conflicting frameworks of market driven pressures and 
government or policy driven objectives, and the lack of a clear pathway for change. Resulting problems include 
misaligned goals, unclear or inconsistent communication channels and ambiguous responsibilities. At the same 
time the sector is hindered by a lack of capacity, insufficient finance and threats from ‘briefcase organisations’. 
The paper also discusses some key remedies for these issues which include streamlined decision-making pro-
cesses, clearly defined stakeholder roles and improved communication channels.   
1. Introduction 
Understanding decision-making of key stakeholders is a crucial part 
of changing the landscape of the energy sector. This research paper seeks 
to shed light on decision-making in Sierra Leone, including who is 
important, their motivations and decision-making dynamics for elec-
tricity supply. 
The current state of Sierra Leone’s energy sector is in acute need of 
improvement: 80% of Sierra Leoneans do not have access to electricity 
[1]. Of those that have access, 17% are connected to the grid and 
another 2–3% are connected to solar, mini-grid or portable home energy 
systems [ibid]. The main source of electricity from the grid in Sierra 
Leone is from the Bumbuna Hydropower scheme, which operates at 
approximately 50 MW during the rainy season [2] and 8 MW in the dry 
season.2 
As a result of the cost of electricity provision from ageing power 
plants in Freetown (and in Sierra Leone more generally) – with their very 
high Operation and Maintenance (O & M) costs – the country is largely 
dependent on temporary electricity supply [3]. This includes electricity 
from a floating power plant called Karpowership,3 at a monthly cost of 
approximately US$2 million, that is moored at Freetown’s harbour [5] 
and is contracted to supply up to 50 MW of electricity [6]. This, together 
with other factors, including commercial and technical losses amounting 
to 45% of generation, makes Sierra Leone’s energy sector financially 
unsustainable.4 
Current global trends are driving humanity to adopt a more sus-
tainable ethos. Climate change demands a rethink in the relationship 
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between fossil energy and development. Countries like Sierra Leone are 
also under political and economic pressure to restructure their energy 
sectors and reform their utilities, which have often failed to develop 
flexible electricity systems that can provide firms with a reliable supply 
and people with access to electricity. It is now well established from a 
variety of studies that Sub-Saharan countries, like Sierra Leone, have the 
potential to expand their generation and achieve universal access to 
electricity by leapfrogging into new technologies [8,9], building elec-
tricity systems needed to sustain growth [10] and creating jobs to lift 
millions of people out of poverty [11]. Reflecting these external pres-
sures and despite the aforementioned constraints, Sierra Leone has set 
ambitious targets in its energy sector reform roadmap for 2017 to 2030 
[12]. These targets aim at improving access to electricity, achieving 
financial sustainability and restoring public confidence in the sector 
[ibid]. On access, the goal is to increase the proportion of households 
with access to electricity from 12.9% at the start of 2018 to 27% by 2023 
[13]. This process would include raising the number of electrified 
chiefdoms5 in the country from 14 reached in 2018 to at least 115 [14]. 
Financial targets include restructuring of the electricity tariff, reducing 
technical and commercial losses to 20% and reducing the overall fiscal 
deficit of the Electricity Distribution and Supply Authority (EDSA) to 
26% by 2023 [7]. Other targets include reducing the unavailability of 
grid electricity from 10 to zero hours a day and ensuring that renewable 
energy accounts for 40% of installed capacity by 2023 [15]. 
For the energy sector in Sierra Leone to improve and meet these 
targets at the rate required, some transformative changes are needed. 
Robust and resilient solutions, acceptable to a range of different stake-
holders, are needed across the energy sector. Electricity provision is 
inseparable from broader societal issues such as the environment [16], 
risk management [17] and health policy [18]. It is also an imperative for 
reducing poverty levels and for ensuring sustainable development. It is 
vital for achieving many of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
[19]. It follows that decisions related to electricity provision have pro-
found impacts on individual lives, the economy, national security and 
the environment. While better decision-making is not the only solution 
to address many of the challenges faced in Sierra Leone’s energy sector, 
it is an important one that is investigated as part of this study. 
Despite the importance of decision-making in the energy sector, 
understanding of this subject in Sierra Leone is limited. To add to this 
knowledge gap of decision-making in Sierra Leone, this research paper 
conducts a stakeholder network analysis to better understand decision- 
making dynamics within the sector. This is the first time such a study is 
conducted in the context of Sierra Leone’s energy sector. The paper is 
organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature of decision-making 
and from this the particular methods and tools are chosen and then 
discussed in Section 3. Section 4 sets out background information on the 
structure of the energy sector and the role of different organisations in 
Sierra Leone. This is followed by a discussion of the main results of the 
study, including an understanding of the decision-making process in 
terms of its key actors, motivators and key strengths and weaknesses. 
Section 5 concludes the paper, presenting the main findings and some 
perspectives for further research. 
To ensure the study’s integrity, a risk and ethics assessment 
following the Medical Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics Com-
mittee (IDREC)  at the University of Oxford in accordance with the 
procedures laid down by the University for Ethical Approval for all 
research involving human participants was completed and approved 
with Reference: R68195/RE001. With permission from participants, 
interviews were recorded. To protect the participants’ identity, all 
names were anonymised. 
2. Decision-making in the energy sector 
2.1. Understanding decision-making 
Decisions by most government sectors are made by sector-specific 
agencies or ministries [20]. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
[21] defines decision-makers as those actors responsible for identifying 
the problems needing a solution and for choosing from the possible 
solutions derived by decision support studies, according to the deci-
sion-makers’ own values and priorities and within the prevailing polit-
ical and social context. However, interdependencies between sectors 
Abbreviations 
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CIDCA China International Development Cooperation Agency 
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ECREEE ECOWAS Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency 
EDSA Electricity Distribution and Supply Authority 
EEG Energy for Economic Growth 
EGTC Electricity Generation and Transmission Company 
EPASL Environmental Protection Agency 
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EWRC Electricity and Water Regulatory Commission 
IDREC Interdivisional Research Ethics Committee 
IPP Independent Power Producers 
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency 
MCCU Millennium Challenge Coordinating Unit 
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MoF Ministry of Finance 
MoH Ministry of Health 
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MoPED Ministry of Planning and Economic Development 
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5 A chiefdom is composed of communities outside the Western Area 
(Freetown). 
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and the increasing complexity of considering environmental and social 
impacts demands that decision-makers seek holistic solutions that take 
account of and are acceptable to a wider range of stakeholder interests, 
not just those that are sector specific [22]. 
The literature on decision-making in the energy sector highlights 
pathways centred on short-term and long-term decisions [23]. 
Short-term decisions are often based on the current state of a nation and 
urgent and immediate needs or challenges. Long-term decisions are 
predominantly driven by forecasts and predictions, as well as broader 
objectives. Long-term energy forecasts make several assumptions about 
human behaviour and technological advancements. Hence Craig et al. 
[24] warn that due to the complexities and uncertainties that charac-
terise human behaviour, decision-makers should be cautious; failure to 
account for imperfections in forecasting can lead to misjudgements and 
consequently incorrect decision pathways. The need to take the right 
decision pathway is accentuated by the long-life nature of electricity 
infrastructure. The European Commission [20, p.15] puts it clearly, 
Choices and decisions matter about which energy […] facilities to 
develop and where, which power plants to build, which to retire and 
which energy or cooling technologies to deploy and develop. Energy 
infrastructure is designed to last for decades …. 
This is all the more important as global climate change imperatives 
point to a compelling case for avoiding “high carbon lock-in” through 
building carbon-intensive electricity systems [25–27]. Taking this into 
account, decision-makers in developing countries must meet a double 
energy challenge of increasing both the scale and the pace of electrifi-
cation in order to kick-start social and economic development [11,28]. 
Studies on power industry transitions in Europe [29] identify two 
decision pathways: market-led and government-led. In the market-led 
decision pathway, decisions were taken by actors at undertakings 
running either private or public profit-motivated businesses. Market 
logic should be driven by the demand-side with more focus on in-
novations in consumption [30]. In contrast, the government-led path-
ways tend to focus on following planning-based decisions which address 
concerns of policy, security of supply, cutting production costs and 
controlling the industrial sector. Thus, to a greater extent, the 
government-led pathways may be more dominated by supply-side is-
sues. Similar to many other developing countries, Sierra Leone has 
agreed – in principle – to follow market-oriented reforms, but the reality 
is that most decisions stem from the supply side and are government 
driven. This is almost inevitable in Sierra Leone’s electricity system, as it 
has major supply side problems and where the people will look to the 
government for solutions. 
Energy sector stakeholders operate at different levels within a power 
structure and have conflicts of interests [31–33]. Consequently, 
different decision-makers will have distinct attitudes towards the 
problem and the ‘best’ solution will differ from one decision-maker to 
another, depending on their particular acceptance of, or aversion to, 
risks and uncertainties [34]. Moreover, trust is increasingly becoming 
central to the decision-making process in the energy sector that is 
characterised by complexity, a wide range of uncertainties, multiple 
stakeholders, large economic and environmental trade-offs and con-
straints from regulations and other controls [35]. Much of the trust 
discourse centres around providing affordable, reliable, sustainable and 
modern energy for all in an equitable way by 2030 and in line with 
Sustainable Development Goal 7 [36]. 
Achieving sustainability should be at the heart of decision-making in 
the energy sector. However, there is a history of optimism bias and 
hubris in the delivery of electrification projects, coupled with the 
persistence of bad policies with expensive, dirty, inefficient and insecure 
outcomes [37,38]. This has justified closer examination of 
decision-making tools, models and approaches [39,40]. In an effort to 
achieve at least acceptable outcomes, if not optimal, several tools for 
mapping stakeholder decision-making have been developed. Some of 
these are discussed in the following section. 
2.2. Stakeholder analysis tools 
The purpose of stakeholder analysis tools is to provide useful infor-
mation to: A) identify who is involved in the decision-making process; B) 
understand the roles of the different stakeholders; and C) help provide 
information on decision-making processes, power dynamics and stake-
holder interests [41,42]. 
Stakeholder network analysis is an approach for quantitative anal-
ysis of relationships between actors. It is frequently applied to devel-
opment and natural resource management literature [43]. It involves 
understanding stakeholders with different expertise and priorities [44]. 
Stakeholder analysis can be applied to understand power dynamics and 
enhance the transparency and equity of decision-making in develop-
ment projects. The approach can develop an inventory of those who 
would have a role in decision-making, gauge their importance through 
their level of influence and their interest for a particular outcome, map 
the relationships between the actors and understand their potential for 
developing alliances [42]. In the context of the energy sector, it has been 
used for a variety of applications such as biomass energy development in 
Slovenia [45] and renewable energy project policy and planning in 
Australia [46] and Indonesia [47]. It has ranged from understanding 
ethical and moral issues in the primary resource sector [48] to 
decision-making for research and development on poverty-focused rural 
mechanisation [49]. 
Reed et al. [43] classify stakeholder analysis as: A) a bottom-up 
“reconstructive method”; or B) a top-down “analytical categorisation”. 
The reconstructive method refers to the process in which stakeholder 
classifications emerge during the stakeholder mapping and are defined 
by the stakeholders themselves [50]. In contrast, analytical catego-
risation refers to the use of predetermined parameters [ibid], such as 
interest and influence, cooperation and competition, cooperation and 
threat and urgency, legitimacy and influence. This is often done through 
matrices or Venn diagrams [51]. 
The RACI matrix is one popular method for characterising stake-
holder roles and uses interest and influence to classify stakeholders 
through a “responsibility assignment matrix” [52]. The RACI model 
distributes authority, making power dynamics explicit by defining roles 
in a task, project or management activity [ibid]. It was selected for this 
study, as it was seen as more appropriate for broadly categorising 
relative levels of importance in decision-making processes. It is also 
intuitive, can be explained easily and is readily understood by people 
with no prior familiarity with the RACI model. RACI refers to:  
• Responsible: Those who do the work to complete the task  
• Accountable: The one ultimately answerable for the correct and 
thorough completion of the task  
• Consulted: Those whose opinions are sought  
• Informed: Those who are kept up-to-date on progress. 
Having established which stakeholder analysis tool is appropriate for 
this study, the next section explains the overall research design in more 
detail. 
3. Research design 
This study seeks to better understand decision-making and its dy-
namics in Sierra Leone’s energy sector, including who is important, their 
motivations and decision-making dynamics regarding electricity supply, 
and the key decision-makers at different project phases. To do this an 
egocentric network mapping approach was adopted [53]. For this 
network mapping methods and the RACI matrix are combined to 
generate data on stakeholder roles through primary interviews. More 
specifically, the following exercises were undertaken: 
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A) a rapid network assessment (RNA);  
B) an online survey; and  
C) face-to-face interviews. 
The purpose of this stepped approach was to enable relevant stake-
holders to inform the wider interview roster, beginning with a known 
group of decision-makers representing both market-led and 
government-led approaches. Identified stakeholders – which are listed 
in full below and consisted predominantly of middle or senior managers 
were then asked to name others that are relevant to decision-making in 
the energy sector as part of the RNA, which in turn informed the par-
ticipants for the online survey. Through this approach, any actor deemed 
to be a relevant decision-maker, be it a government authority or 
corporate enterprise, could be identified and included. Actors which are 
not included were not widely identified as relevant to the study scope by 
others. This process is further described below. 
3.1. Rapid network assessment 
The purpose of the RNA was to generate an initial list of individuals 
important for decision-making processes in the Sierra Leone energy 
sector. To guide this process, individuals relevant to on-grid and off-grid 
electricity supply decisions and policy making were identified from an 
initial list of stakeholders in the Ministry of Energy (MoE), Electricity 
and Water Regulatory Commission (EWRC), Electricity Generation and 
Transmission Company (EGTC), Electricity Distribution and Supply 
Authority (EDSA), Department for International Development (DfID),6 
the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) and selected 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). These stakeholders provided the 
initial list of participants for the online survey, based on the stakeholders 
they interact with on electrification projects. This process is known as 
snowball sampling.7 A total of 29 stakeholders were identified. 
3.2. Online survey 
Following the RNA, an online survey was conducted. The purpose of 
this survey was to 1) verify and, where needed, expand on the stake-
holder list originally generated as part of the RNA; and 2) to understand 
how these stakeholders engaged with each other in decision-making 
processes. As part of the survey, participants were therefore required 
to: (A) list additional stakeholders that are typically involved in elec-
trification projects and decision-making in Sierra Leone’s energy sector; 
(B) indicate their frequency of interaction with all stakeholders listed; (C) 
identify key influences for on-grid and off-grid decisions and policy 
making; and (D) identify the typical role of key stakeholders in decision- 
making using the RACI matrix. Of the 29 participants identified by the 
RNA, a total of 11 participants – spanning different types of organisa-
tions (see Table 1) – took the online survey. 
3.3. Face-to-face interviews 
Following the online survey, face-to-face interviews were 
undertaken during the first quarter of 2020. A total of 16 interviews 
were conducted (see Table 1). The number of participants in each 
interview varied from 1 to 6 participants. A total of 30 people took part 
in the 16 interviews.8 Stakeholders were predominantly middle to senior 
management and involvement was dependent on availability; all 
stakeholders identified were invited to partake. 
The interviews took approximately 30 min and consisted of two 
parts: 1) a stakeholder mapping exercise using the RACI matrix to fill 
data gaps that remained after the online survey and 2) a verbal semi- 
structured interview. For the first network mapping exercise, partici-
pants were asked to list stakeholders that are typically involved in en-
ergy sector projects and decision-making in general. These names were 
placed on an RACI matrix: each name was written on a post-it note and 
placed on the appropriate location of the 2x2 matrix. Participants sub-
sequently indicated stakeholder involvement at different stages of 
project development: from inception to planning, implementation and 
operation. Defining involvement by project phase, rather than by project 
type, was recommended by the first interviewee and was a methodo-
logical improvement over the online survey that was originally 
deployed. This was because, in the case of Sierra Leone, almost every key 
stakeholder is involved in a typical project, regardless of its type.9 A 
generalised picture, therefore, would not provide much insight. Inves-
tigating who does what and when, however, should reveal the crux of 
how the sector works. The network data generated during the interview 
formed the basis for the qualitative discussion which were broadly 
centred around the following four guiding questions:  
1) How are decisions in the energy sector made?  
2) Who were the key decision-makers and what roles do they play?  
3) What are the main influences on their decisions?  
4) How could decision-making be improved? 
The information from the verbal interviews are used to support the 
assertions made in Section 5. Stakeholder quotations are interspersed as 
part of a collective database without attribution to a specific 
interviewee. 
3.4. Data analysis 
The online surveys were analysed using Gephi network software 
[55]. Analysis produced preliminary graphic representations of the data 
in order to identify clustering and gaps in the stakeholder network. The 
Table 1 
Study participants of online survey and face-to-face interviews per organisation 
type.  
Organisation Online Survey 
Participants 
Face-to-Face Interviews (multiple 
participants) 




Utilities 2 2 




NGO – 1 
Total 11 16  
6 Please note that since the writing of this article DfID has merged with the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). This unit is now known as the 
Foreign, Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO).  
7 Snowball sampling is a process whereby participants are asked to identify 
others relevant to the topic studied [54]. It is a commonly used approach for 
identifying an initially unknown roster of relevant stakeholders. 
8 The interviewees in each interview were from the same organisation, and 
were interviewed as a unit. In most cases, one person spoke on behalf of the 
group, with occasional contribution from the other members. Interviewees were 
instructed to respond from the perspective of the organisation they represented. 
The implication is that data represent institutional roles and relationships more 
so than those of individuals.  
9 This was also in line with the findings from the online survey that confirmed 
a close knit of stakeholder involved in all projects. 
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online survey response rate was insufficient to conduct quantitative 
analysis, and these preliminary graphics were therefore used primarily 
to inform areas for subsequent investigation during face-to-face in-
terviews. Specifically, preliminary analysis suggested the presence of a 
tight cluster of interactions. Rather than continuing with whole network 
analysis, face-to-face interviews placed increased emphasis on the roles 
played by stakeholders at different stages of project development rather 
than a generalised view of sector involvement. There was a focus on 
project stages because A) the whole network analysis was not providing 
much insight on sector dynamics and B) the first interviewee recom-
mended this change. 
To understand the relative importance of different stakeholders, the 
physical placement of the different stakeholders in the form of post-it 
notes on the RACI matrix (as part of the face-to-face interviews) was 
converted into X and Y coordinates, whereby overall coordinates for 
each stakeholder were calculated by averaging the given coordinates for 
each stakeholder from all the interviewees. Each set of coordinates in the 
RACI matrix was transformed to a single digit score, S, that denotes how 
influential that stakeholder is in Sierra Leone’s energy sector. In the 
transformation:  
• the most accountable stakeholder, sitting at the upper right corner of 
the RACI matrix with coordinates (1,1), was awarded a score of 4. In 
general, the score, S, for a stakeholder anywhere in the first quadrant 
was deduced from: 
S= 4 − 0.5
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
(1 − X)2 + 9(1 − Y)2
√
(1)  
where X and Y are the coordinates of the stakeholder in the RACI 
matrix;  
• the most responsible stakeholder, sitting at the upper left corner of 
the RACI matrix with coordinates (− 1,1), was awarded a score of 3. 
In general, the score, S, for a stakeholder anywhere in the second 
quadrant was deduced from: 
S= 4 − 0.5
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
(1 − X)2 + 4(1 − Y)2
√
(2)    
• the most consulted stakeholder, sitting at the lower left corner of the 
RACI matrix, with coordinates (− 1,-1), was awarded a score of 2. In 
general, the score, S, for a stakeholder anywhere in the third quad-
rant was deduced from: 
S= 1 + 0.5
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
(1 − X)2 + 4(1 − |Y|)2
√
(3)    
• the most informed stakeholder, sitting at the lower right corner of the 
RACI matrix, with coordinates (1,-1) was awarded a score of 1. In 
general, the score, S, for a stakeholder anywhere in the fourth 
quadrant was deduced from: 
S= 1 + 0.5
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
(1 − X)2 + 9(1 − |Y|)2
√
(4)    
• the score for a stakeholder at the intersection of two quadrants was 
taken as the average of the scores yielded by the equations for the 
two quadrants;  
• and stakeholders at the origin were awarded a score of 2.5, which is 
the average of the scores yielded by Equations (1)–(4). 
The score for each stakeholder was normalised by the fraction of 
interviews that identified the stakeholder as relevant to decision- 
making. The absolute score, Sabs, for each stakeholder was obtained 





where N is the number of interviews mentioning the stakeholder. This 
score was then expressed as a percentage of the relative score for the 
most influential stakeholder in Sierra Leone’s energy sector. 
The qualitative interview discussions were transcribed and under-
went a process of inductive coding, using HyperResearch [56], whereby 
themes emerge from the coding process. To ensure consistency, 
cross-sectional indexing was used [57]. This resulted in the following 
outputs:  
(A) Ranking of stakeholders by their perceived importance in 
decision-making in the energy sector as a whole;  
(B) Ranking of stakeholders by their frequency of involvement in the 
different project phases; and 
(C) An understanding of decision-making processes and power dy-
namics described during qualitative interviews. 
3.5. Research limitations 
The stakeholders interviewed as part of this study may not represent 
all stakeholders relevant to decision-making in the energy sector in Si-
erra Leone. This paper used an initial list of key stakeholders to inform 
the wider roaster of actors deemed relevant stakeholders for inclusion 
(snowball sampling). The limitation is dependence on respondents to 
provide recommendations. For example out of the 29 stakeholders 
identified from the RNA, only 11 took the online survey. Therefore the 
findings here were non-conclusive and only indicative of sector dy-
namics. This may have also led to results being skewed towards those 
who completed the survey and some stakeholder groups (e.g., the Pe-
troleum Directorate or the oil sector more generally) being exclu-
ded–although they may have been represented indirectly through 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). Notably as a result of the initial list 
of stakeholders, end-users were underrepresented. Responses never-
theless indicated a degree of consensus around the most relevant actors. 
Subsequent work may revisit the established roster of interviewed 
decision-makers, particularly if a revised scope places increasing focus 
at sub-national and local levels of the sector. It should also be stated that 
there was a difference in numbers of interviewees representing in-
stitutions. This was partially due to the availability of actors during the 
time of interviews and may have further skewed the results. 
4. Results and discussion 
This section presents the results of the stakeholder analysis and the 
discussion of those results with the aim of generating a better under-
standing of decision-making in Sierra Leone’s energy sector. The section 
is broadly laid out to follow the four guiding questions stated in Section 
3.  
1) How are decisions in the energy sector made?  
2) Who were the key decision-makers and what roles do they play?  
3) What are the main influences on their decisions?  
4) How could decision-making be improved? 
More specifically, a brief background regarding the structure of the 
energy sector and the role of different organisations in Sierra Leone is 
provided (Section 4.1). This is followed by an investigation on how 
stakeholders in Sierra Leone’s energy sector are positioned (Section 4.2), 
their role in decision-making in the sector in general (Section 4.3), as 
well as with regards to the different project phases (Section 4.4). The 
core motives of decision-making in the energy sector in Sierra Leone 
applicable to different stakeholder groups are then discussed (Section 
4.5). Finally, the discussion highlights decision-making strengths and 
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weaknesses and identifies opportunities for improvement (Section 4.6). 
4.1. Sierra Leone’s energy sector organisation 
Sierra Leone’s energy sector is made up of a network of stakeholders. 
Each has specific and clearly defined responsibilities, albeit these should 
be in alignment with the overarching goal of providing reliable, 
affordable and sustainable power to the people of Sierra Leone [12,58]. 
Key stakeholders include the Ministry of Energy (MoE), the two elec-
tricity utility companies (namely, the Electricity Generation and 
Transmission Company (EGTC) and Electricity Distribution and Supply 
Authority (EDSA)), the regulator (namely, the Electricity and Water 
Regulatory Commission (EWRC)), Independent Power Producers (IPP), 
Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), parliament, develop-
ment partners (DPs), Independent Power Producers (IPPs). These are 
further discussed below. 
The MoE, led by the Minister of Energy (the political head) and the 
Permanent Secretary (the professional head), sits at the centre of this 
network of stakeholders. The primary mandate of the MoE is to provide 
oversight functions across the sector, as well as implement the central 
government’s agenda and policies on energy [58]. These agendas and 
policies, most often, are in alignment with the manifesto of the ruling 
political party and therefore are susceptible to change after national 
elections that usher in a new government. Sierra Leone’s political 
landscape is dominated by two political parties: the ruling Sierra Leone 
People’s Party (SLPP) and the opposition All People’s Congress (APC). 
Since gaining independence in 1961, the APC has ruled for a total of 35 
years, the SLPP for 18 years and the military for 6 years [59]. However, 
following the birth of multiparty democracy in 1996, the two parties 
have ruled for almost equal periods, with power changing hands every 
two terms (a term is five years). It is therefore unsurprising that Sierra 
Leone’s energy policies since independence have generally oscillated 
between the development plans of these political parties. 
The EDSA is responsible for distribution and revenue collection from 
consumers, as well as operation of the transmission grid below 33 kV. 
The EGTC manages generation and transmission above 33 kV. These two 
were previously a single entity, the National Power Authority (NPA), 
before being unbundled in a sector reform process through an Act of 
Parliament in 2011 [60]. Some ambiguities in their relationship remain 
even though the reform process has concluded. One such ambiguity is 
that the EDSA and EGTC were intended to be independent entities with a 
strict producer–consumer relationship. However, to date, their opera-
tions are largely subsidised by the central government, which in return, 
appoints their top management staff as well as the board of directors. In 
addition, the EDSA owes the EGTC huge sums in arrears for energy 
generated [7]. According to a number of interviewees, the latter, 
apparently, has no means of redress. 
The unbundling of the NPA also gave birth to the EWRC. It regulates 
the operation of utility companies and IPPs, balancing their interests 
with those of the consumer to ensure fairness [61]. In the energy sector, 
it achieves this by developing, monitoring and reviewing tariff guide-
lines, regulatory frameworks, quality standards and licensing re-
quirements for operators. 
MDAs’ – like the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Justice 
(MoJ), Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MoPED), 
Ministry of Lands (MoL), and the Public Private Partnership Unit (PPPU) 
– also play crucial roles in the energy sector. The MoF for instance, 
ensures fiscal discipline in the planning of projects funded by the central 
government and administers government subsidies to utilities. The MoJ 
ensures that there are no legal loopholes in energy contracts between the 
MoE and its contractors. The MoPED ensures that the policies and 
strategies of the MoE are in line with the central government’s devel-
opment agenda. The MoL facilitates the acquisition of land for energy 
projects and ensures that new power plants are not built on protected 
land. The PPPU sits in the Office of the Vice President of Sierra Leone 
and was established to provide professional advice on public–private 
partnership agreements between public and private institutions [62]. 
The MCCU is a US aid agency, also in the Office of the Vice President of 
Sierra Leone. Its goal is to help improve the financial viability of Sierra 
Leone’s energy sector as part of a $44M programme [63]. 
The parliament of Sierra Leone, the legislative arm of government, 
presides over the enactment of national energy policies that require 
government approval. Since members of parliament represent the nation 
as a whole, parliament serves as a gateway for informing government 
about the energy needs of the people. This is one of the functions of the 
parliamentary committee on energy. The committee also provides 
oversight functions for ongoing and commissioned electrification 
projects. 
Development Partners (DPs) and financing institutions contribute to 
the development of the energy sector through direct funding of specific 
projects and capacity building. The United Nations Office for Project 
Services (UNOPS), for instance, has recently commissioned solar mini- 
grids in 54 communities across 12 districts in Sierra Leone [64]. 
IPPs – which include independent developers, investment banks and 
other investment firms – are central to meeting Sierra Leone’s electri-
fication targets. Fundamentally, they are interested in selling electricity 
to either consumers or the grid through a Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA). 
4.2. Decision-making dynamic 
The RACI matrix was used to identify how stakeholders were posi-
tioned in Sierra Leone’s energy sector, as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The stakeholder interviews showed that while the key actors (i.e., the 
Ministry of Energy-Technical (MoE-T), -Political (MoE-P), Electricity 
Generation and Transmission Company (EGTC), Electricity Distribution 
and Supply Authority (EDSA) and Independent Power Producers (IPPs)) 
were consistently identified – this is in line with the preliminary results 
from the online surveys which indicated a closely linked sector with a 
limited number of actors – there was less consistency in terms of their 
perceived roles. Specific roles can also differ by project. Fig. 2 shows a 
summary of the perceived roles of key stakeholders (those with an 
importance score, Sabs, of more than 10%). 
Most key actors were consistently placed in particular roles (i.e., 
MoE-P, IPPs, Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Electricity and Water 
Regulatory Commission (EWRC)). It is interesting to observe that there 
was greater deviation in placing the technical arm of the MoE (i.e., MoE- 
T). This may be attributed to differing responsibilities related to specific 
projects. For the utilities, EDSA and EGTC, an almost equal percentage of 
interviews places them as accountable (∼ 45%) and informed (∼ 55%). 
This is not surprising as both can play dual roles as authorities and 
implementers. Apart from the Millennium Challenge Coordinating Unit 
(MCCU), there was also less consensus on the role of development 
partners (DPs) (e.g., UNOPS, DfID, JICA) and financial institutions (e.g., 
World Bank and AfDB). This may be attributed to differing levels of 
involvement in projects depending on who initiates and oversees spe-
cific programmes. Organisations often play a larger influencing role in 
projects that they are funding. 
4.3. Decision-making – general 
From the network mapping, a number of core actors important in the 
energy sector in general are identified. This is based on the absolute 
score (Sabs) and is shown in the overall bar plot in Fig. 3. These core 
actors were also among the most important throughout all project 
phases. They are now discussed below with the absolute importance 
score shown in brackets.   
• Ministry of Energy (MoE-Political Wing¼100, MoE-Technical 
Wing¼48): The MoE, more specifically the political and senior au-
thorities, is at the centre of decision-making. Regardless of the 
project type, the MoE-P is directly involved at all stages of a project 
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and always ranked as most important. Signoff from this authority is 
thus key throughout the project and buy-in from MoE officials is 
central to the success of any project. Interestingly, however, the 
technical arm of this ministry (i.e., MoE-T), though also involved at 
every stage of the project life cycle, is not as powerful as the political 
arm at the inception phase. This is so because the initial stages of 
projects are predominantly discussed at the political level, which is 
usually the case for government and donor initiated projects. 
Fig. 1. RACI matrix for decision-making in Sierra Leone’s energy sector. The position of each stakeholder is defined by the average X and Y coordinates of that 
stakeholder, as obtained from the interviews. The size of the circle is directly proportional to the stakeholder’s absolute influence score, which is based on a 
transformation of the coordinates of its position. The transformation assigns a score of 4 to the most accountable stakeholder, 3 to the most responsible, 2 to the most 
consulted and 1 to the most informed. This score is then normalised by multiplying it by the fraction of interviews that identified it as relevant to decision-making and 
expressed as a percentage of the score for the most powerful stakeholder. 
Fig. 2. Key stakeholders and their RACI roles as a function of the percentage of interviews in which they were mentioned as playing those roles in a typical en-
ergy project. 
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• Utilities (EDSA¼69, EGTC¼68): The two government-owned util-
ities, EDSA for distribution and EGTC for generation and trans-
mission, were identified as playing a key role in the country’s 
electricity generation and delivery. These two utilities contain most 
of the professional engineering expertise in Sierra Leone that is 
relevant to generation, transmission and distribution. They are also 
aware of the operating characteristics of the electricity system as it is 
today and hence of the technical and economic implications of 
changes to it. The essential requirement of coordination in any 
electricity system inevitably makes them key actors, which explains 
why they are more active at the planning, implementation and 
operation phases of projects rather than the inception phase.  
• Independent Power Producers (IPPs¼59): IPPs, such as Winch 
Energy, Energicity and Powergen RE, are central to meeting Sierra 
Leone’s electricity needs. They are becoming increasingly important 
because they are seen as providing a source of finance for the major 
investments that are required. It is not surprising that they have been 
identified as key actors in the decision-making processes, but this 
identification requires careful interpretation. In principle, multiple 
IPP will be competing to offer projects to Sierra Leone, and their 
advice will primarily be of relevance in relation to the particular 
projects that each of them is willing to offer. Their motivation will 
also necessarily be geared to their own financial interest and should 
be seen in the context of actual or potential competition with other 
IPP providers or in the context of negotiation with the government of 
Sierra Leone on particular projects. They are most active at the 
implementation and operation phases of government and donor 
initiated projects but at all four phases of IPP-initiated projects. 
4.4. Decision-making – project phases 
Discussed below are the four project phases of a project in Sierra 
Leone (inception, planning, implementation and operation) and the top 
stakeholders in each phase in terms of their frequency of selection see 
Fig. 3). 
4.4.1. Inception phase 
Project inception usually begins at the political level. Decisions 
typically include political dimensions, in line with the manifesto of the 
government in power at the time. Thus having signoff from the MoE, 
more specifically the MoEs’ Political and Senior Authorities, is key at the 
inception stage. Projects can be initiated by Government, Development 
Partners (DPs) or an IPP. The decision-making process partially depends 
on the origin of the project. For example, an IPP can make an unsolicited 
proposal to the government for a project or respond to a government call 
for proposals. The IPPs role in decision-making and the stages where 
they are involved will be affected by this process. The stakeholders in the 
inception phase which are involved in decision-making depends on who 
initiates the project. For instance, a project financed by a DP will 
naturally draw greater involvement from that DP in decision-making. In 
Sierra Leone, substantial resources come from DPs (e.g., DfID, JICA) or 
financing institutions (e.g., World Bank): they currently finance much of 
the energy sector in Sierra Leone. Even projects with private sector 
involvement may still have significant contribution from DPs. Thus it is 
unsurprising that they are ranked highly for decision-making in the 
inception phase. In fact, they maintain presence at all stages of the 
projects they initiate or fund. A number of other key stakeholders, as 
well as the above, are particularly important to decision-making at the 
inception phase: 
• Parliament: Major sector decisions may require formal parliamen-
tary approval to confirm their legal status. Much of the decision- 
making is, however, delegated to ministries for management and 
even support in drafting legislation. Parliament also, sometimes, 
influences the initiation of projects, based on the needs of the com-
munities its members represent.  
• Other Ministries: Other Ministries and regulators are also involved 
at early stages. Government entities including the Ministry of Justice 
Figure 3. Bar plots of stakeholders showing the number of times they were mentioned for each stage of a typical energy project (Inception, Planning, Implementation 
(Impl.), and Operation) and their absolute influence score (top chart: Overall). The absolute influence score is based on a transformation of the coordinates of the 
stakeholder’s position in the RACI matrix. The transformation assigns a score of 4 to the most accountable stakeholder, 3 to the most responsible, 2 to the most 
consulted and 1 to the most informed. This score is then normalised by multiplying it by the fraction of interviewees that identified it as relevant to decision-making 
and expressed as a percentage of the score for the most powerful stakeholder. 
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(MoJ), the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Public Private Part-
nership Unit (PPPU) are involved to assess project risks and other 
factors.  
• Local authorities: These regional offices can affect the decision- 
making process. Some, such as Paramount Chiefs, have direct per-
sonal connections to senior government officials that they can in-
fluence, particularly in terms of decisions relating to project location. 
4.4.2. Planning 
There is little bandwidth for project planning in Sierra Leone and the 
logical planning process that would be expected for an energy sector 
“does not exist”.10 This can partially be attributed to the country’s lack 
of internal resources for direct project funding and its dependence on 
DPs. Reliance on external resources undermines the planning process. 
The MoJ and the MoF, in particular, have specific mandates to assess 
fiscal and legal risk in energy sector projects at the planning stage of a 
project. Other agencies including the PPPU and EWRC also play 
important formalised oversight roles. Therefore it is not surprising that 
these organisations have been frequently mentioned during this stage. 
Said key stakeholders are further discussed below:  
• Electricity and Water Regulatory Commission (EWRC): At this 
stage of a project, the role of the EWRC is granting licences to IPPs, 
discussing tariff structures and undertaking periodic tariff reviews 
with these IPPs. It also ensures that IPPs have the required docu-
mentation to operate in Sierra Leone. The capacity of EWRC has 
reportedly been developed with support from UNOPS as part of their 
Rural Renewable Energy Project. The EWRC was commended for its 
effectiveness, by non-government stakeholders, during this research.  
• Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs): The MoF has a 
particularly important role to play at the planning stage of projects 
funded by the government of Sierra Leone and also in Power Pur-
chase Agreements (PPAs) between the government and IPPs. Its 
approval is required before such projects can move to the next stage. 
The MoJ is the Sierra Leone government’s legal representative dur-
ing project contract negotiations. A project cannot move to the next 
stage without its no-objection advice. At this stage of the project, the 
PPPU guides the MoE in private-public partnership agreements with 
stakeholders in the private sector (IPPs for instance). 
4.4.3. Implementation 
The most active stakeholders at this stage of the project life cycle are 
the IPPs and private sector contractors who are charged with the re-
sponsibility of bringing the project to completion. To achieve this, they 
work with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPASL), consumers 
(local communities) and the Ministry of Lands (MoL). These stake-
holders, together, help in the acquisition of land for the project and 
enforce adherence to Sierra Leone’s environmental policies. Other 
stakeholders involved at this stage are the EWRC, the Sierra Leone 
parliament, donor partners (for donor initiated projects) and the utili-
ties, EGTC and EDSA. EDSA, for instance, works with IPPs to ensure that 
off-grid plants that would eventually connect to the grid meet certain 
technical requirements. 
4.4.4. Operation 
The utilities (EGTC for generation and transmission and EDSA for 
distribution) are seen as most important at the operations stage. This is 
not surprising, as they are responsible for technical work and operations 
of Sierra Leone’s electricity system. Although important, the importance 
of the MoE is less – in contrast to other stages – at the operation stage 
because once a project is commissioned, the MoE’s role is reduced to 
providing oversight. They are only called into action if something grave 
is amiss or a PPA requires an extension. Nevertheless, a number of in-
terviewees had mentioned that the active participation of the technical 
arm of the MoE at this stage could help MoE engineers to become 
familiar with decisions and technical matters that are relevant for the 
success of projects. It is believed this approach would improve capacity 
for making future decisions, particularly in the operations phase after 
implementation. 
Another important stakeholder here is EWRC, as they preside over 
tariff reviews, ensure strict adherence to regulatory standards and, most 
importantly, monitor service delivery to ascertain compliance to pre-
agreed quality standards and value for the consumers’ money. 
Finally, IPPs were mentioned as being very prominent at this stage of 
the typical project and rightly so, since normal practice is that they 
operate the power plants they build. 
4.5. Stakeholder motives 
A number of core objectives of decision-making in the energy sector 
in Sierra Leone applicable to different stakeholder groups were identi-
fied. These are further discussed below.  
• Everyone wants the energy sector to improve. There is broad 
intent to improve the energy sector in Sierra Leone. This is because 
energy is a serious issue, everyone is crying, ‘we want energy’. 
People are asking for light even more than water. The motivation to 
get things done and advance the sector is visible across the range of 
stakeholders, from consumers to politicians and from donors to 
technocrats. Consumers feel the impact of service quality directly 
and can be frustrated by delays in implementation.  
• Politicians want quick and visible results. The political arm of the 
government – including the MoE and the MPs – want quick and 
visible results. The government manifesto typically drives the pri-
orities of political stakeholders and most of the decisions have been 
political instead of technical. This creates pressure on the govern-
ment both to make services affordable by reducing tariffs and to 
attract resources that can deliver new projects. New projects also 
provide more visible results, and therefore more political capital, 
than maintenance activities. 
• Other governmental entities are trying to minimise risk and li-
ability. The MOJ and the MOF, in particular, have specific mandates 
to assess fiscal and legal risk in energy sector projects. Other 
agencies, including the PPPU and the EWRC, also play important 
formalised oversight roles. These risks appear to be real. Multiple 
stakeholders commented on ‘sharks’ or ‘briefcase organisations’ 
attempting to establish unfavourable deals with the government.  
• Technocrats implement and strive for systematic planning. 
Technocrats are considered to do the engineering. Engagement of the 
technical arm typically follows the initially political decision-making 
process. Technocrats, such as representatives from the EDSA or 
EGTC, are motivated to optimise planning and ensure that technical 
specifications are met.  
• The private sector is motivated by profits. The motives of private 
service providers such as IPPs are perhaps unsurprising: profitability 
comes first. As one interviewee states: Beyond politics, it’s the 
business model that drives everything. Fundamentally, IPPs are 
interested in selling electricity to either consumers or the grid 
through a PPA.  
• Donor objectives and worldviews influence priorities. Donors 
carry influence because of sector dependence on their resources. 
They can have their own agenda that extends beyond the scope of the 
Sierra Leone energy sector such as wanting to promote certain ap-
proaches or technology types. Western donors, for example, may be 
motivated to promote renewables because they are part of an inter-
national ‘green’ agenda.  
• Desire for sustainable services. There is a perception that the 
government understands that things are not really working on any 
10 As outlined in Section 3, stakeholder quotations are interspersed as part of a 
collective database without attribution to a specific interviewee. 
S.A. Hirmer et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 145 (2021) 111093
10
level in the energy sector and that this needs to change. The amount 
of subsidy needed for energy is undermining other sectors. There is 
an appetite for alternative options and a willingness to accept that 
desirable political outcomes such as tariff reductions need to be 
balanced with the need to sustain commercially viable services. 
• Politicians are motivated to support their constituents. Politi-
cians can face considerable pressure from their local constituents for 
support on local initiatives. Equally, MPs can feel a strong motivation 
to give back to their home regions. According to one interviewee, if 
projects (such as the CLSG project11) had been more accessible to 
local influences, then the interviewee would have ensured that the 
transmission line passed through their home village rather than its 
current route. 
At a more detailed level, the motives for prioritising certain projects 
or approaches over others was not clear and can thus not be commented 
on. Below some key decision-making implications and opportunities for 
improvements are discussed. 
4.6. Decision-making strengths and weaknesses 
Some government stakeholders perceive there to be an open and 
transparent decision-making process in Sierra Leone that is functioning 
well. While this was not explicitly endorsed by stakeholders outside of 
government, 30% of interviewees mentioned that existing decision- 
making processes in Sierra Leone are working well but that there is 
room for improvement. This leads on to what is and what is not working 
fully with regards to decision-making in Sierra Leone from the 
perspective of the stakeholders interviewed as part of the face-to-face 
interviews. Where applicable, key recommendations are given in bold. 
Presently, each stakeholder group involved has its own policy, 
mandate and perspective, resulting in decision-making processes which 
are not always clear. Government, Development Partners (DPs) and 
individuals can affect sector outcomes. To elaborate, every government 
has its own manifesto, and a change in government means a change in 
priorities. A further challenge is that projects can last longer than one 
term of office, which can lead to delayed, compromised or suspended 
implementation. As one interviewee states: At times, a change of gov-
ernment affects everything in our country. This can be corroborated by 
Tengbe et al. [65, p.10], who found, in their review of law in Sierra 
Leone, that: The present position of the law does not reflect or admin-
ister these aspirations [optimising the renewable energy potentials of 
the country] […]. Aspirations are reflective of the intentions of the 
present government and therefore form ‘policy’. In a similar sentiment, 
DPs can significantly affect processes. Planning is difficult due to 
dependence on donor funding for projects, which is hard to influence. 
The government reacts to project opportunities because it needs the 
investment; this reliance on external resources can undermine the 
planning process. Plans can be developed but, without the resources to 
implement them, these plans can easily be sidelined if other opportu-
nities arise. Such challenges also apply at the level of individuals – not 
just broad political objectives – since decision-making is about people as 
much as their positions. Thus it is not surprising that ultimately de-
cisions can sometimes directly reach the level of the president. This 
dependence on government, DPs and individuals can create bottlenecks 
in the process. To address this, the sector could greatly benefit from 
streamlined decision-making processes. 
One option here would be the development of a comprehensive 
plan that is independent from government, DP or individual priorities 
and is adhered to by key stakeholder groups. While an energy sector 
roadmap12 for Sierra Leone has been rolled out in 2018 [12], those 
interviewed clearly see this as insufficient. In congruence with this, 
stakeholders called for clear processes and steps to be established and 
followed, saying that “the sector is not really there right now”. If a clear 
process is in place, then project proposals that do not meet requirements 
need not even approach the MoE. While the Millennium Challenge 
Coordinating Unit (MCCU) is supporting the development of an Inde-
pendent Power Producer (IPP) solicitation process,13 it is clear from the 
interview commentary that more work is needed in this area. 
However, for the aforementioned streamlining process to be suc-
cessfully implemented, there is a need to address the existing capacity 
gap in the sector. Reportedly there are insufficient resources to maintain 
consistent processes, particularly within the MoE. The importance of 
building the capacity of key decision-makers has also been highlighted 
by Sokona [66, p.2] who writes that capacity is not the ability to 
implement someone else’s agenda but the ability to set and pursue your 
own agenda and, in that sense, it should be a core element of any 
development narrative. The capacity gap in Sierra Leone has direct 
implications on the ability to manage contracts and administration more 
broadly: contracts can get lost in the pile, procurement is slow and there 
is little bandwidth for planning. This may also be attributable to the fact 
that responsibilities are somewhat fluid: they change depending on 
specific projects. The result is that the processes are unclear: it is not 
certain who needs to be involved at which stage of a project. For 
example excluding, Local Authorities from certain stages of 
decision-making can cause problems later on. This points towards a need 
for clearly defined roles for key stakeholders. That said, the foregoing 
capacity gap is not only apparent in the MoE but also in other govern-
mental offices such as Parliament. Thus parliament and MPs are unable 
to participate in sector decision-making to the extent needed, preventing 
them from playing a more active oversight role. 
In addition to addressing this capacity gap, another aspect identified 
from the interviews as important to streamlining decision-making pro-
cesses is that of improved communication channels. At present, un-
clear or inconsistent communication channels negatively affect 
decision-making processes. As a result many key stakeholders are un-
informed about ongoing activities in the sector. This in turn directly 
corroborates reports of existing coordination challenges. The implica-
tion is that multiple parts of the sector need to improve simultaneously 
for the sector to advance overall. For example, generation is unhelpful if 
energy cannot reach consumers. Utilities – in this case EDSA (respon-
sible for distribution) – cannot pay power producers (EGTC (responsible 
for generation and transmission) or IPPs) if they operate with substantial 
losses. This clearly illustrates the need for better sector coordination. 
Not only that, several stakeholders recommended that technocrats 
should be more involved in decision-making at the project inception 
phase: the authorities are out of sync with technical realities and the 
political agenda at times is the main focus. This could help guide de-
cisions that lead to technically sound projects: decisions should be 
informed by robust planning and a technical understanding of the issues. 
This is particularly important as the current underperformance of the 
state-owned utilities – EDSA and EGTC – significantly impacts decision- 
making in the sector. This affects what is prioritised and who is involved. 
11 The Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea (CLSG) electricity 
networks interconnection project involves the construction of a transmission 
line to connect the national networks of the aforementioned four countries. 
12 The roadmap [1] is a document that identifies, at a high level, what the 
government wants and how they want it. It lays out a vision for the energy 
sector in Sierra Leone. The intent is for IPPs proposing projects to fit into the 
vision defined by the roadmap.  
13 The IPP solicitation process is developed by the MoE in collaboration with 
the MCCU for both solicited and unsolicited IPP procurement. If successful, this 
process will help to define the steps and requirements of IPPs seeking to develop 
energy projects in Sierra Leone. 
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There needs to be a clear strategy either to recognise the utilities as 
public entities or to bring in independent governance to drive perfor-
mance incentives. Under the current state-owned model, there is a bias 
towards politically motivated decision-making, and project imple-
mentation can be hindered when key stakeholders are not fully incor-
porated into the decision-making process. 
A final key decision-making aspect that was mentioned is the facil-
itation of IPPs. They can face common challenges when establishing 
their operations and working through sector decision-making processes. 
The presence of stakeholders to broker relationships between the MoE 
and IPPs could help to improve this interaction. Currently, with the 
absence of such brokers to help manage relationships and aggregate 
issues, each IPP has to individually establish and maintain relationships 
with the MoE. Through a brokered relationships, IPPs could be able to 
negotiate service arrangements. To this end, there is a need for selected 
stakeholders to act as liaisons or brokers that help IPPs engage MoE. 
5. Conclusion 
This research set out to better understand decision-making in Sierra 
Leone. This included examining who are the key decision-makers; what 
are their roles at which stage of the project (inception, planning, 
implementation and operation); how are decisions made; and what are 
the main influences on their decisions. 
First this study considered who made decisions and at which stage of 
the project. It was found that the different actors with the greatest 
relevance in different aspects of the sector are fairly clear. They include, 
irrespective of the project stage, the Ministry of Energy (MoE), the 
utilities (Electricity Distribution and Supply Authority (EDSA) for dis-
tribution and Electricity Generation and Transmission Company (EGTC) 
for generation and transmission) and Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs). Other actors that are particularly important to decision-making 
at the different stages are as follows: 1) the United Nations Office for 
Project Services (UNOPS) at the project inception phase. This is un-
surprising as the decision-making at the inception phase depends partly 
on the origin of the project. In the case of UNOPS, they have recently 
launched a large-scale energy access programme in Sierra Leone. 2) The 
Electricity and Water Regulatory Commission (EWRC) and the Public 
Private Partnership Unit (PPPU) at the planning stage of a project. At 
this stage, the PPPU is responsible for guiding the MoE on agreements 
with stakeholders. The EWRC grants licences and oversees that the 
appropriate documentation is in place. 3) The implementation stage 
tends to match the initiation stage: whoever launched the project will 
have a greater relevance. 4) At the operation stage – albeit important 
throughout – the utilities (EGTC and EDSA) play a particular important 
role as they are responsible for the technical work and operations in 
Sierra Leone’s electricity system. 
Secondly influences in decision-making were examined. While 
formal processes exist for most state-owned institutions and de-
partments, decision-making in Sierra Leone depends significantly on 
individuals and their interests. Our study was unable to provide insights 
at a more detailed level on decision-making motives for prioritising 
certain projects or approaches. Nonetheless, it was evident that decision- 
making in Sierra Leone is influenced by the desire for 1) energy access at 
all levels of decision-making; 2) quick and visible results from politi-
cians; and 3) reduction of risk and liability for governmental entities 
such as the Ministry of Justice or Ministry of Finance. 
This presents a challenge to achieving the transformative shift 
needed within the desired timescales. At the moment, priorities do not 
align with one another – something that is not uncommon to decision- 
making in general [67]: different actors have different objectives. This 
in turn affects sector outcomes and is counterproductive to progress in 
the energy-sector. 
Finally, this paper identified improvements that need to be made to 
decision-making processes in Sierra Leone’s energy sector. A number of 
key observations can be made on the basis of the analysis and descriptive 
detail outlined in this publication. The most important observations that 
emerged from the stakeholder interviews are a need for clearly defined 
stakeholder roles, improved communication channels and streamlined 
decision-making processes. A new comprehensive plan which clearly 
addresses these issues, together with capacity building, would be an 
important step in improving the decision-making in Sierra Leone. 
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